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Abstract 
Computer viruses pose a considerable problem for 
users of personal computers. The recent emergence 
of macro viruses as a problem of some importance 
may heighten virus awareness in general. Yet most 
people have little or no understanding of common 
anti-virus measures, the varieties of viruses that 
exist today, and the strategies which they use to ac-
complish infection and to defeat anti-viruses. It is 
well-known that the virus problem is most severe for 
users of IBM PCs and compatibles; however, users 
of other platforms, such as the Macintosh, should 
not become complacent - viruses exist for many 
platforms in varying numbers. The ease with which 
macro viruses may be written is discussed, and a 
new virus attack for the Macintosh is presented 
which closely resembles an attack under DOS for 
the PC. 
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1 What is a Computer Virus? 
There is some difficulty in producing a definition 
for the term "computer virus". Dr. Cohen has 
presented a mathematical definition of a computer 
virus, which may be roughly expressed as: 
A virus is a program that can 'infect' 
other programs by modifying them to 
include a possibly evolved version of 
itself. [4] 
However, this definition classifies as viruses many 
things which would not be considered viruses by 
those working in the anti-virus field. At the same 
time this definition would not consider as viruses 
programs that infect another without modifying 
the target program itself [2] (an example of such 
a virus are the companion viruses, discussed in 
Section 3). 
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Additionally, the above definition does not con-
vey any need for the "virus" to be able to replicate 
further once it has infected some other program 
[2] - and replication is viewed as an important 
characteristic of a true "computer virus" . 
A definition which is felt to be more practically 
useful when dealing with "real" computer viruses 
than Dr. Cohen's mathematical model is: 
We define a computer 'virus' as a self-
replicating program that can 'infect' 
other programs by modifying them or 
their environment such that a call to 
an 'infected' program implies a call 
to a possibly evolved, and in most 
cases, functionally similar copy of the 
'virus'. [21, 2] 
The term 'infect' is used with respect to com-
puter viruses in the sense of the definition above 
throughout the remainder of this document. 
It is important to note that a virus is not nec-
essarily malicious - although it may have side 
effects (as a result of the virus clashing with the 
operating system, user programs and extensions 
to the standard operating system installed by the 
user) which are deemed to be undesirable. 
Some researchers have been considering the 
question of viruses that perform useful actions 
- so-called benevolent viruses. Cohen [4, pp. 
15-21] considers briefly the topic of benevolent 
viruses. He considers as examples: 
Compression viruses - little-used files are 
compressed by the virus and uncompressed 
when required. 
Maintenance viruses - any virus which would 
perform maintenance tasks in a computer sys-
tem, such as updating installed programs. 
Distributed Databases with viruses -
viruses would reproduce on networked 
computers, performing searches for the virus' 
originator. Results would be reported back 
by mail, and the virus would clean itself up 
after a certain time. 
The use of viruses in covert distributed data 
processing (specifically, key cracking on encrypted 
messages) has been proposed by White [13]. It 
may be argued, however, that this would not be 
particularly beneficial to the user whose resources 
are used by the virus. 
Many arguments against the idea of benevolent 
viruses are presented by Bontchev [2]. 
2 Worms, Trojan Horses, Droppers 
and Logic Bombs 
A worm is an independent program that is able to 
spread copies of itself or of parts of itself to other 
computers, commonly across network connections, 
and these copies are themselves fully functional in-
dependent programs, which are capable either of 
spreading further and/or of communicating with 
the parent worm (to report back results of some 
computation, for example). 
There is often confusion over the distinction be-
tween a worm and a virus. For example, the 
program that negatively affected the Internet in 
November 1988 is referred to as a virus ("the In-
ternet Virus") by some [5] and as a worm ("the In-
ternet Worm") by others [11, 12, 10]. Spafford [12] 
argues that referring to the infection as a "worm" 
rather than a "virus" is most appropriate. 
A notable difference between worm programs 
(such as the Internet Worm) and viruses is that 
while a virus may take advantage of network con-
nections to infect other programs (some local area 
networks are particularly susceptible, as the user is 
able to interact with programs and data stored on 
a remote machine as if they were available locally), 
it is not capable of causing its code to execute on 
a remote machine. Clearly the well-known worms 
have been able to cause their programs to be exe-
cuted on the remote machine which was the worm's 
target. 
The Internet Worm affected Sun 3 and VAX 
systems running variants ofBSD UNIX [11]. Other 
worms have been created with other networks in 
mind, such as DECnet [7]. 
A trojan horse is a program which possesses 
various intentional undocumented features! whose 
effects few users of the software would appreciate 
were these undocumented features to manifest 
themselves. Unlike a computer virus, which 
attaches itself to some other program using any 
of a number of methods, a trojan horse is a 
self-contained program. A trojan horse may have 
functions of use to the user. 
Some definitions of "trojan horse" define a com-
puter virus as a replicating trojan horse which in-
serts a copy of itself into some other program [1]. 
1 As opposed to bugs in the program, otherwise known as 
"unintentional undocumented features" . 
A trojan horse might install a virus as its in-
tentional undocumented action. Some feel that a 
program which installs a virus as a result of having 
been previously infected with the virus is also a 
trojan horse (having been converted into a tro-
jan horse by the virus) [18]. However, this seems 
incompatible with the notion of a "trojan horse" 
being a program which was initially produced with 
an intentional undocumented feature in place. 
A dropper is a program which acts as a carrier 
for a computer virus. A dropper is not the result of 
a normal infection of some program by a virus - it 
exists only to spread the virus. The virus is usually 
kept by the dropper in a form which will not be 
detected by anti-virus software [18]. Some macro 
viruses (see Section 3) attempt to act as a dropper 
for more conventional varieties of viruses [15], in 
addition to whatever other actions they perform. 
3 Varieties of Viruses 
There are a number of different ways that viruses 
use to infect a computer system. The two main 
types of viruses are: 
File Infectors: These are VIruses that attach 
themselves to some form of executable code. 
There is a variety of ways in which a virus 
might attempt to infect a file. On a DOS-
based system, file infectors will commonly 
attach themselves to . COM or . EXE files, 
although there are many other kinds of 
infect able objects. 
Boot Sector Infectors: Only discussed in the 
context of a PC-compatible system. These 
kinds of viruses infect executable code which is 
loaded from disk and called when a computer 
is starting up. There are a number of different 
pieces of code which may be modified by a 
virus to infect a system, such as: 
• DOS boot sector [floppy disks and hard 
disks]. 
• Master Boot Record (MBR) [hard disks 
only]. 
• Partition table [hard disks only]. 
A virus that is capable of spreading by infecting 
files and by infecting via any code executed at boot 
time is known as a multipartite virus. 
Boot sector viruses are extremely widespread; 
as a group they are easily the most commonly found 
variety of virus on PC-compatible systems. 
A virus may be direct-action or resident [18]. 
A direct-action virus is one that when initiallyexe-
cuted in the course of normal use of a computer 
system identifies executable objects for infection 
and exits once infection has been accomplished. 
Direct-action viruses may also be referred to as 
non-resident viruses. 
A resident virus is one which installs itself some-
where in memory, and makes arrangements for the 
virus body in memory to be executed at some fu-
ture time; the virus may infect files or take other 
action (to conceal its presence, for example) at the 
time it is next executed. For example, some Mac-
intosh viruses if resident in memory will infect an 
application when that application commences run-
ning and performs certain system calls that ini-
tialise the Macintosh Toolbox, which consists of a 
set of utility functions available to all applications. 
Some programs useful to the user are also resi-
dent programs - this includes some antivirus pro-
grams that monitor computer system operations 
f~r actions which may indicate the presence of a 
VIrus. 
There are some other types of viruses which 
should be mentioned: 
Macro Viruses: These are explained in detail in 
Section 4. The ease with which such a virus 
may be written is discussed in Section 9.2. 
File System or Cluster Viruses: Rather than 
infecting files directly, such a virus modifies 
directory table information so that the virus 
is executed first. It would then pass control 
to the program that the caller really wants 
so as to avoid rapid detection. "Dir-II" IS an 
example of this variety of virus. [18] 
Kernel Viruses: These are viruses that target a 
specific feature of an operating system's kernel 
(the program(s) that represent the heart of an 
operating system). [18] 
Companion Viruses: Companion viruses occur 
in several varieties [3, 8], the most notable 
being: 
Regular Companion: Creates a file in the 
same directory as the target of infection 
but with a filename extension which the 
operating system chooses to execute be-
. fore the original file (for example, under 
DOS a . COM file is executed before a . EXE 
file with the same name). This would 
appear to be an attack which is highly 
specific to PCs running DOS. 
PATH Companion: Create a file with any 
executable extension in a directory that 
is searched for executable files before the 
directory containing the target of infec-
tion (named after the PATH environment 
variables found in operating systems such 
as DOS and UNIX). 
Obviously, not all of these infection strategies 
are available on some platforms and operating sys-
tems. For example, Macintosh computers do not 
suffer from companion viruses as described above 
in any form, and also don't appear to be afflicted 
with viruses of the boot sector variety. 
All viruses, with the exception of macro viruses, 
are platform dependent. 
4 Macro Viruses 
The anti-virus community has been aware for some 
time now ofthe potential for virus-writing provided 
by the scripting (or macro) languages of large soft-
ware packages such as Microsoft Word and Excel 
The idea of macro viruses was first introduced by 
Highland [6]. 
However, it is only recently that such viruses 
have become a problem. These viruses are 
remarkable for the fact that they infect what are 
usually thought of as documents. A macro virus 
may also be platform independent, being capable 
of spreading on any computer platform supported 
by the host application. The most well-known and 
widespread are Microsoft Word viruses written 
in WordBasic (two examples are Concept and 
Nuclear). 
Microsoft Word recognises the existence of two 
different forms of user file - an ordinary document, 
and a template. A template is very much like an 
ordinary document, with the addition that tem-
plates may also contain macros written in WordBa-
sic. Ordinary documents may be converted easily 
into templates, but the reverse is not the case. 
Word has a "global template" , the so-called "Nor-
mal template", which is used by every document 
created, and is important for the spread of macro 
viruses - the macros that make up the virus are 
copied into the Normal template where they are 
subsequently available to other documents. 
Word macros may be marked as ExecuteOnly 
which means that the macros cannot be easil; 
edited or inspected by a Word user but can only be 
executed. Some viruses, for example the Nuclear 
virus, use this method to hinder casual analysis of 
the viral macros. 
Macro viruses in Microsoft Word exploit the ex-
istence of several varieties of macros within Word-
Basic [15]: 
• The AutoExec macro, stored within some 
global template such as the Normal template, 
which is executed automatically whenever 
Word is started. 
• "Auto" macros, which run whenever certain 
user actions take place within Word: 
- AutoNew runs when a new document is 
created. 
- AutoOpen runs when an existing docu-
ment is opened. 
- AutoClose runs when an open 
document is closed. 
- AutoExit runs before Word exits when 
the user quits. 
• Macros named for Word menu options, which 
are run when the menu option is selected. 
A basic Word virus is not difficult to create, 
requiring just one macro. The macro virus DMV 
features a single macro AutoClose. The Normal 
template will be infected when a document 
containing the DMV AutoClose macro is closed. 
Subsequently, documents are infected as they 
are closed [15]. Concept, a more complicated 
macro virus, signals its initial infection of the 
Normal template, and subsequently will infect 
any document with the viral macros when the 
document is saved using the "Save as ... " option 
of the "File" menu (an example of a virus using a 
macro named for a Word menu option). 
Some macro viruses, such as DMV and Con-
cept do nothing but spread. Some would argue 
that even this is damaging, in terms of the time 
required to remove the virus macros from whatever 
documents have been infected. More damaging 
actions are certainly possible, however. For exam-
ple, a virus might delete paragraphs from a docu-
ment, or rearrange or insert words (the Nuclear 
virus will append some lines of text to documents 
when printed at a certain time). More sophisti-
cated macro viruses attempt to infect the user's 
computer with an ordinary variety of virus which 
infects executable files (the Nuclear virus unsuc-
cessfully attempts to do this), however behaviour 
such as this is platform dependent. 
A virus can also give itself some (limited) 
protection against being removed by implementing 
a ToolsMacro macro, which is then executed in 
place of the corresponding menu option should 
it be selected by the user. This menu command 
offers one possible way for macros to be removed 
from a document, if the environment has not 
already been infected by a virus. 
Disabling of the features of Microsoft Word 
which allow automatic execution of certain macros 
when documents are opened and closed offers 
some limited protection, but as macro viruses can 
be written with macros that mask menu options 
(macros which cannot be disabled in the same 
way that automatic macros may), this is hardly a 
complete solution. 
5 Virus Occurrences 
There have been a great many viruses created for 
many different computer platforms. The PC has 
by far the largest share of all the viruses in exis-
tence (the producers of Dr. Solomon's Anti- Virus 
Toolkit, a leading anti-virus package, claim to de-
tect 9417 PC viruses [20]). 
Many of these PC viruses are closely related 
(once a virus becomes available, it is not uncommon 
to find a number of copycat viruses that differ only 
slightly from the original appearing, perhaps writ-
ten by less-skilled virus writers using virus source 
code; alternatively, the virus author might release 
a number of viruses with different payloads but 
sharing common code for infection and anti-anti-
virus measures). 
Some information has been gathered by Virus 
Bulletin about PC viruses that have been reported 
as found over the course of a month for some 
months. The percentage of the reports made up 
by the various virus classes for several months of 
1996 are shown in Table 1 [22]. 
Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep. 
Macro 21.8 18.4 20.2 34.3 
Boot 62.5 64.5 59.2 53.7 
Multi partite 7.3 10.6 13.9 6.6 
File 8.4 4.8 6.4 4.8 
Other 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Unclassified 0.0 1.3 0.4 0.6 
Table 1: % of reports to/collected by Virus Bulletin 
made up by various classes of virus. 
Only a very few of the total number of known 
viruses are responsible for the majority of virus 
incidents. Some on-access anti-virus products use 
this fact to help restrict the number of viruses that 
a file must be checked for when accessed by a user. 
Viruses exist for a number of other personal 
computer platforms, such as the Amiga and the 
Macintosh, but the numbers of these viruses are 
a small fraction of the numbers of viruses available 
for the PC. The Macintosh, for example, is afflicted 
with only a few dozen viruses. Viruses written to 
target UNIX are especially uncommon. 
6 Virus Anti-Detection/ Anti-
Analysis Strategies 
There are a variety of strategies which a virus might 
employ to hinder detection of the virus, and anal-
ysis once it has been discovered: 
Stealth: While the virus is active in memory, it 
can intercept disk reads, and when it detects 
an attempt to read a section of the disk (such 
as the boot sector, partition table or master 
boot record) or a file that has been infected by 
the virus, can conceal its presence by returning 
as a result of the call data with no signs of 
infection. Most stealth viruses are boot sector 
viruses (it being much easier to detect reads 
of these areas of the disk). Some examples of 
stealth viruses are [17]: 
• Members of the "Brain" strain of viruses 
are stealth floppy boot sector viruses. 
• The "512" virus (also known as "Number 
of the Beast") is a stealth file infecting 
virus. 
Polymorphic Viruses: A polymorphic virus is 
one that is capable of varying many aspects of 
its appearance in the hope of avoiding detec-
tion. Cohen refers to viruses of this type as 
"evolutionary" viruses [4, p. 73]. The strate-
gies which might be employed by a polymor-
phic virus are (many of these strategies for 
code 'evolution' are explained in greater detail 
by Cohen [4, pp. 199-215]): 
Encryption: Encrypt the body of the 
virus not only with a variety of different 
keys but also with a variety of different 
encryption strategies (each requiring 
a different decryptor, of course). The 
encryption approach is a particularly 
common polymorphic trick - its wide 
use was facilitated by the distribution of 
a variety of object code modules (such as 
MtE and TPE) which could make any 
virus polymorphic. Additionally, this is 
the most straightforward polymorphic 
strategy which a virus might employ. 
One of the many viruses which employs 
a strategy of this sort is the "Tequila" 
virus [17]. 
Instruction Equivalence: Some ma-
chine instructions achieve equivalent 
effects. Substitute for these equivalent 
instructions in the virus code. 
Equivalent Instruction Sequences: 
Replace one sequence of machine 
instructions with another which achieves 
the same final result. 
Instruction Reordering: Sometimes it 
is possible to reorder a sequence of 
instructions in a variety of different ways 
and still achieve the same result. The 
"1260 virus" is one which alters the 
order of instructions in its decryption 
routine from infection to infection, 
and additionally inserts irrelevant 
instructions [17]. 
Variable Substitutions: Alter which 
memory locations contain each of 
the variables used by the program. 
Especially effective if the variables are 
dispersed about the program. 
Add or Remove Jumps: Add unnec-
essary jump/branch instructions to 
a program while still preserving its 
function (this makes the program 
longer, of course), or remove existing 
jump/branch instructions by moving the 
program code which was the destination 
of the jump/branch. 
Add or Remove Calls: Replace 
to subroutines with a copy 
subroutine; replace a sequence 




Garbage Insertion: For example, might 
add NOP instructions, or other 
instructions which do not otherwise 
achieve any useful purpose apart from 
obscuring the code's functions. The 
"Tequila" virus employs a strategy of 
this sort [17]. 
Simulation: Replace an instruction 
sequence with an alternative sequence 
which achieves the same effect when 
interpreted (or simulated) appropriately. 
Build and Execute: 'Build' instructions 
somewhere in memory (one byte or 
a sequence of bytes at a time) and 
then execute them. This obscures the 
instructions being constructed from 
observation until their execution. 
Intermixing Programs: Interleave the 
instructions for separate programs or 
blocks of code in such a way that the 
interleaved code achieves the same result 
as the separate blocks of code. 
Tunnelling: A technique sometimes used by 
viruses that attempts to bypass activity-
monitoring virus detectors (for example, 
by bypassing operating system disk access 
functions and interpreting the contents of the 
disk itself, or calling the operating system's 
functions directly to avoid any trap the 
activity monitor may have set in place) or 
otherwise subvert anti-virus techniques and 
strategies. 
Cavity Virus: A variety of file infecting virus 
which overwrites a portion of the file which 
is filled with the same value, such as a region 
filled with zero bytes. Such a virus will not 
alter the total length of the file. 
Antidebugger Mutations: Various tricks can 
be employed to make disassembling and 
tracing the program code difficult. For 
example, the program code might be arranged 
in such a way that an instruction or set of 
instructions is hidden from casual inspection, 
so that the function of the code is no longer 
readily apparent from its disassembly. The 
debugger itself could be manipulated in the 
course of tracing a program by tampering 
with the debugger's address space. 
The speed with which a virus reproduces and 
infects other files is also important. Some viruses 
spread particularly quickly. For example, a virus 
might be programmed to infect any executable file 
when the file is opened, for whatever reason. These 
are the so-called fast infectors. 
A slow infector is a virus which only infects 
files as they are created, immediately prior to or 
following a legitimate change (that is, some change 
that the user wants to have happen), or as files are 
copied, perhaps onto a floppy disk [3, 9, 18] [4, p. 
91]. 
7 Defenses Against and Detection 
For Viruses 
There are a variety of defenses against viruses, and 
ways of detecting their presence. A natural first 
question is: "Is it possible to detect all viruses?". 
Unfortunately not - it is mentioned in Cohen [4, 
pp. 64-68] that it is not possible to construct some 
program which correctly determines whether or not 
some other program is a virus. In fact, given a 
known virus, it isn't even possible to systematically 
determine using a computer program if another 
program is infected with a virus derived from the 
original known virus in some way. 
However, there are a variety of imperfect ways 
to detect the (possible) presence of computer 
viruses. Most forms of virus detection involve false 
positives, which occur when an object is identified 
as being infected by a virus when in fact it is 
clean, and false negatives, which occur when an 
object is passed as clean when in fact it has been 
infected with a virus. Ideally, false positives and 
false negatives will occur very infrequently. 
Some techniques, such as scanning for viruses, 
often lead to a positive identification of a virus. 
In many cases, the infection (and some damage) 
caused by the virus is reversible. 
Stealth techniques mean that attempts at virus 
detection that involve manipulating file objects on 
disk will not necessarily be effective if the virus 
is present and active in memory. For this reason, 
it is recommended that before attempting to de-
tect a virus, the computer in question be rebooted 
from an uninfected, locked, floppy disk containing 
a clean version of whatever anti-virus software is 
needed to search for viruses. 
Known-Virus Scanning: Attempts to identify 
viruses by scanning files for certain strings 
of bytes known to occur in particular 
viruses. Simple scanners which perform 
only such searches are easily defeatable by a 
well-written and sophisticated polymorphic 
virus, so many also employ some more 
advanced techniques (such as heuristic 
analysis, to detect suspicious code fragments, 
or algorithmic analysis, to detect complex 
polymorphic viruses). Scanners often have 
difficulty detecting new viruses, and they 
require frequent updating. 
Heuristic Analysis: Attempts to identify 
a possible virus by looking for code that 
performs functions which in combination with 
each other are deemed to be suspicious. An 
example of a suspicious code fragment would 
be one that alters the first few bytes of an 
executable file in memory - this would be 
required so that an infected executable could 
run normally when infected with a virus. 
Behaviour Blocker/Monitor: Attempts to 
detect viruses based on patterns of virus 
activity. This approach has problems 
because many of the actions performed by 
a virus are perfectly legitimate under other 
circumstances. These methods are also 
sometimes rendered ineffective if a tunnelling 
virus is infecting the system - these viruses 
are frequently able to bypass the methods 
used by a monitor to detect virus activity. 
Integrity Checker/Integrity Shell: Integrity 
checking involves collecting a database of 
signatures for each file which is likely to 
be the target of a virus infection (such as 
application programs). If at a later date this 
signature can be determined to have changed, 
then it is possible that a virus infection has 
taken place. This method will not detect 
viruses before infection takes place. There are 
a variety of enhancements to the basic method 
outlined here which must be implemented 
(for example, a companion virus does not 
necessarily modify the item it "infects". So 
integrity checkers must attempt to identify 
the presence of a companion virus by other 
means). An integrity shell [4, pp. 83-93] is a 
more sophisticated approach which involves 
checking every object on which some object 
X (which the user wishes to use in some way) 
depends. 
An integrity checker is an example of a generic 
anti-virus program - it is not targeted at a specific 
virus or class of viruses and so will rarely need 
updating. Integrity checking issues are extensively 
discussed in papers by Bontchev [3] and Radai [9]. 
There are a variety of other ways to help prevent 
virus infections. For example, as the great major-
ity of PC virus infections are boot sector viruses , 
changing the order in which the computer searches 
its disk drives for a boot able disk is an effective 
defense in many cases (an apparently common set-
ting is to attempt to boot a floppy disk before 
attempting to boot the hard disk). Precautions 
will still have to be taken to deal with multipartite 
and other non-boot sector viruses, of course. 
Cohen outlines a number of strategies that 
will prevent or hinder computer viruses spreading 
throughout a computer system or computer 
network [4, pp. 57-64]. The most interesting of 
these approaches is that of limited sharing. The 
best that can be done to limit sharing in a transitive 
information network that implements sharing is 
to base the structure on a "partially ordered set", 
or POset. This means that information can flow 
in only one direction, for example, from Host A 
to Host B but not from Host B to Host A. This 
effectively limits the possible range of a viral 
infection, and also helps to trace the origin of any 
suspected infection, as the source of the infection 
would be one of a limited number of machines 
which had access to all of the machines on which 
the infection was ultimately detected. 
The use of a "vaccine" against certain computer 
viruses is a technique no longer widely practiced. 
Most viruses check a potential infection target to 
make sure it is not infected by that particular type 
of virus (to prevent multiple infections), so infec-
tion by a particular virus could be prevented by 
marking executables so that they appeared to be 
already infected (hence the name "vaccine"). The 
large number of viruses and the fact that some 
virus' identification techniques are mutually con-
tradictory means that this technique is no longer 
workable. 
8 Problems with and Attacks 
Against Anti-Virus Measures 
Virus scanners need updating with great frequency 
because of the speed with which new viruses are 
created and released. They are popular for a num-
ber of reasons: 
• A scanner is usually straightforward to use. 
Whether or not it is in fact used in the recom-
mended manner is another matter. 
• When a virus is detected it can often be pos-
itively identified, and many scanners include 
facilities for "disinfecting" infected files. 
• A scanner is the most reliable means of de-
tecting a known virus in a new file; other tech-
niques are not necessarily applicable (for ex-
ample, an integrity checker cannot be used to 
check a newly-obtained program for viruses, 
because there is no way of determining what 
the signature of an uninfected program should 
be). 
A scanner will sometimes perform poorly when at-
tempting to detect unknown viruses. 
Polymorphism was at one time an effective 
attack against scanners which merely searched 
for strings of bytes known to characterise certain 
viruses. Cohen states that "until several years after 
the MtE was spreading in the world, no scanner 
was able to pick up over 95% of infections" [4]. 
The situation has improved greatly in recent times 
- most good scanners are capable of detecting 
the majority of polymorphic viruses. 
As mentioned in Section 7, stealth viruses may 
cause problems if the virus is present in memory 
when using a virus scanner or integrity checker, 
as files presented for inspection may appear clean 
when in fact they are not. Furthermore, a variety 
of fast infector stealth virus may take the opportu-
nity presented by the opening of numerous files for 
checking to infect those files; this represents a seri-
ous cleanup problem in an environment with hun-
dreds (or possibly even thousands) of executable 
files. An attempt must be made to identify such 
viruses in memory. 
Activity monitoring programs require updating 
as well, to cope with new virus behaviours. There 
are some varieties of virus behaviour which are not 
readily detectable by a monitor - such as infect-
ing only files which are about to be modified in 
any case. One particular virus, the "Darth Vader" 
virus, was designed to avoid alerting an activity 
monitor program by attaching itself only to certain 
files as they were copied [3]. This also presented an 
effective attack against integrity checkers at that 
time. 
Activity monitors have the additional problems 
in that they may flag legitimate actions as suspi-
cious, since the functions used by computer viruses 
commonly have legitimate uses as well. They might 
also be bypassed by a tunnelling virus or disabled 
in memory [3, 9]. 
Slow infectors are a concern for integrity check-
ing software. The virus infection may go unnoticed, 
because the integrity checker doesn't have any sig-
natures in its database with which to compare that 
of the (new) file. An example of a common legiti-
mate change to an existing executable file is the ad-
dition of patches to the file by an updater program. 
Radai [9] suggests that it would be possible to de-
tect the presence of a slow virus by creating a series 
of small executable files in the hope that one will 
be infected by a slow virus. Copies of the created 
executable could be created for easy comparison 
with the first. This will not establish which other 
newly-created or modified objects are infected with 
the slow virus, however. Tracking down the source 
of the infection could be problematic. 
Programs which cause modifications to their 
own executable code will cause problems for 
integrity checkers. It is difficult to know how 
widely such bad programming habits are practiced 
at this time. 
Integrity checkers will not be effective against 
all types of viruses. As integrity checking is usually 
applied only to hard disks (its application to floppy 
disks is not practical, as the contents of a floppy 
disk are frequently modified) a virus which infects 
floppy disks only and ignores hard disks would go 
unnoticed [9, 3]. The "Brain" virus, an early DOS 
virus, is an example of a virus which ignores hard 
disks. 
Finally, integrity checkers need to be carefully 
constructed so that the database of checksums is 
not easily compromised by a virus. For example, 
a virus might attempt to forge an entry in the in-
tegrity checker's signature database for a program 
which is a target of infection. 
9 Recent Work 
9.1 Companion Viruses and the 
Macintosh 
Macintosh viruses infect application files, the Sys-
tem file (a file present on every boot able Macin-
tosh disk which holds many resources used by the 
operating system) or system extensions (small files 
containing executable code which load every time 
the Macintosh is started up and which add extra 
functionality to the operating system). A very few 
viruses which no longer work under recent releases 
of the operating system infected the Macintosh by 
more unusual means. 
The Macintosh does not have any features 
which correspond to the preference of DOS to 
execute .COM files before .EXE files of the same 
name (when the selection is not made explicit). 
Nor does it feature the concept of a "path" 
along which the operating system searches for 
applications to execute if the desired application 
is not in the current directory, as DOS does. So 
a companion virus which does not actually alter 
the target application is not implementable in the 
same manner as under DOS. 
However, it is possible to produce a virus with 
many of the same characteristics as a companion 
virus by manipulating a Macintosh disk's Desktop 
Database. This attack seems not to have been 
explored to date. 
Macintosh files have both a file type (for 
example, 'TEXT' denotes a plain text file) and 
a creator. Each application should have a 
unique creator code, with which the files that the 
application creates are marked. The "Finder" (the 
part of the Macintosh operating system which 
is responsible for presenting the graphical user 
interface and managing user interactions) stores 
information about file creators which allows it to 
determine what application should be launched 
when a document icon is double-clicked, and what 
icon should be displayed for a file of a certain type 
and creator. 
When there is more than one application 
present with the same creator, then the Finder 
launches the application with the most recent 
creation date when documents are double-clicked. 
Applications which are launched as the result of a 
user double-clicking a document icon are sent by 
the operating system what is referred to as a high 
level event or Apple Event, detailing which 
document or documents are to be manipulated. 
A viral application, with a more recent 
creation date than the infected application, would 
be launched by the Finder before the target 
application, and would then have an opportunity 
to infect further applications (for example, any 
application currently running which has not 
already been infected, or perhaps by scanning 
the directory tree for uninfected applications, 
processing only a few directories at a time so as 
to avoid detection), or to perform other actions. 
The viral application would then pass control to 
the infected application. The Apple Event which 
details the documents to be processed can easily 
be passed on to the target application, so that 
there is little outward evidence that anything 
unusual has taken place. 
This method of infection seems to function well 
on hard drives with single and multiple partitions, 
and should infect Macintosh file servers as well. 
The ability of such a virus to conceal itself is 
limited, being restricted to setting the position of 
its document icon displayed by the Finder to some 
point off the edge of the display window. 
Like companion viruses of DOS, this attack 
avoids altering any existing executable code or 
system resources. 
9.2 Macro Viruses 
A traditional virus can be quite difficult to write, 
as there are many factors which must be considered 
if the virus is to work successfully and be able to 
avoid detection on a wide range of systems running 
a variety of software products. 
Simple macro viruses, however, are not ham-
pered by many of the same considerations. As an 
exercise, a number of very simple macro viruses 
were implemented by Horton. A first attempt re-
quired only a single macro, AutoClose. This at-
tempt was very crude and would be easily detected 
by an alert user, as infecting a document when it 
was closed (causing the AutoClose macro to run) 
required that the document be saved to disk with 
the viral macro attached. 
A later, slightly more sophisticated offering was 
implemented using two macros, AutoOpen and 
FileSaveAs. The AutoOpen macro would be 
activated whenever an infected document is opened 
in Word. If Word's Normal template is not al-
ready infected, the virus then infects the Normal 
template, which is a global macro file visible by 
all documents, by copying the viral macros to the 
template. 
From this point on, whenever the user selects 
Save As . .• from the File menu, the FileSaveAs 
macro (now attached to the Normal template) is 
activated instead. It performs the same tasks as the 
usual menu option, with the exception that before 
the document is saved it is converted to a template 
to which the viral macros are then attached. 
Neither of the two macro viruses created im-
plemented any "payload" macros, although the ad-
dition of a simple payload would be trivial. The 
viruses are not remarkable for the techniques they 
employ, which are found in other macro viruses. 
The first implementation attempt of a macro 
virus was accomplished in approximately eight 
hours by a computer science graduate previously 
unfamiliar with Microsoft Word and WordBasic. 
No documentation was available other than the 
"Help" system of Microsoft Word and a freely 
available description of some common macro 
viruses [15]. 
The second attempt required another hour, and 
was sufficiently sophisticated that it would be able 
to replicate unnoticed. A greater familiarity with 
WordBasic would be required to write anything 
more sophisticated, but the exercise illustrates the 
fact that macro viruses, because of their ease of 
construction, permit a much wider pool of com-
puter users to write computer viruses in a very 
short space of time. 
Macro viruses are quite widespread and so sam-
ples are often easy to obtain. Furthermore, under-
standing the code of a macro virus (assuming that 
the macros are not marked as ExecuteOnly) is very 
much less difficult than interpreting the assembly 
language in which non-macro viruses are typically 
implemented. The study of techniques used to im-
plement other macro viruses is one straightforward 
method of improving virus writing. 
More sophisticated macro viruses might 
target specific computer systems by attempting 
to "drop" a non-macro filesystem virus into 
the target system, or perform other operating 
system dependent actions. This would require 
greater familiarity with WordBasic or other macro 
languages than are demonstrated in a simple 
macro virus, such as the ones created as a part of 
this exercise. 
10 Summary 
This paper has presented a definition of computer 
viruses as the term is commonly used, as well as 
attempting to explain the meaning of some other 
terms, such as "worm", which are often closely as-
sociated with viruses. The various types of viruses 
that currently exist and various methods used by 
those viruses for infection have been explained, and 
the types and numbers of viruses likely to be found 
in the wild have been considered. 
The various ways viruses currently use to hinder 
detection and delay analysis once they have been 
detected were discussed. Commonly available anti-
virus measures were explained, as well as faults and 
problems that these methods are known to have. 
Finally, some recent work on the ease of imple-
mentation of simple macro viruses and the imple-
mentation of a companion virus-type attack for the 
Macintosh was discussed. 
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